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1 Introduction 
On retirement individuals are expected to live on what they have saved over their working 
life-times if they are not to be dependent on the state or family. However, investments made 
over the working life-time may be inadequate to provide fully for retirement. Whilst it is 
obvious that one must save enough to retire on, it is not always clear how much is enough, or 
how best to save this. This can, and usually does, result in individuals retiring with less 
income than they need or expect (Masilela, 2011a), and in many cases, causes them to 
become dependent on their families or the state. 
The most common method used by formally employed individuals to save for 
retirement is contributing into a pension fund
1
 (Andrew, 2004). In some cases this is all an 
individual will have saved for retirement. As a result, there is a need to ensure that a pension 
fund meets its most basic objective of providing adequately for retirement.  
For most, serious consideration of the adequacy of savings to meet retirement 
needs will come later in life than is optimal (Old Mutual, 2012). This can result in people 
retiring with less than what is actually required or desired. Facer and Reynolds (2010) 
suggest the three reasons below as the most common causes of inadequate retirement savings: 
1. Individuals save too little, as a proportion of the total income that they earn. 
2. Individuals start saving too late in their working life-time, decreasing the total amount 
that they can save and losing out on the benefit of compound interest on earlier 
savings. 
3. Individuals do not inv st their savings in a way that produces required returns for 
retirement adequacy. This can be as a result of making inappropriate asset allocations 
over the working life-time. 
Other reasons for inadequate savings include a failure to preserve benefits at 
withdrawal , and a lack of knowledge of how much is enough when it comes to retirement 
saving (Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006), such that individuals do not have specific target 
benefits. This results in not knowing when the savings held are on track to meet the 
retirement needs, and what corrective measures are required, if any. 
All these factors are further worsened by the fact that individuals do not save readily. 
Masilela (2011a) noted that though there have been increasingly favourable conditions to 
encourage saving, such as higher income, the removal of retirement fund taxes, decreasing 
                                                          
1
 The term pension fund is used here and in the rest of the document to refer to pension funds, retirement 
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income taxes and decreasing inflation, the level of saving has actually decreased. Chiroro 
(2010) also notes how in spite of negotiated wage increases by trade unions and other 
favourable conditions, it is still difficult to get South Africans to save. The South African 
Savings Institute (Masilela, 2011b) says that individual savings in South Africa are declining 
every year. South Africa is estimated to have a savings rate of 15% as compared to other 
emerging economies, such as the East Asian markets, whose saving rates are consistently 
above 20% and average over 30% (Masilela, 2011a). 
In South Africa, the greatest barrier to saving, including retirement saving, is the 
absence of a regular income, or a very low one (Chiroro, 2010). This is true for the lower 
income bracket. Chiroro (2010) further suggests that in the middle income bracket, where 
greater saving would be expected, the greatest barrier to saving for retirement is over-
indebtedness caused by the excessive use of credit, making it difficult for these individuals to 
save. 
Andrew (2004) noted the findings of the Mouton commission, that about 80% of 
formally employed individuals belong to an occupational retirement fund, which is usually 
sponsored by the employer or affiliated to a bargaining council. These individuals will likely 
contribute to these funds for as long as they are employed, or compelled to by their employer.  
This research looks at some of the reasons behind inadequate retirement provisioning 
and the effect of improved member communication on the contribution and preservation 
decisions. The research is limited to defined contribution pension funds, as defined in 
section 3.1. The research considers whether increasing the quantity and quality of information 
provided to pension fund members could result in better decision-making and ultimately 
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2 Research Problem 
2.1 Pension funds and benefit adequacy 
Uncertain events with financial consequences create the need for individuals to have a fall-
back savings position such as an income protection plan or savings set aside for such 
incidences. Asher (2007) used the concept of the financial life-cycle, as explained by 
Modigliani (1986) to identify the various risks that individuals face prior to retirement. These 
risks include death, disability and retrenchment. Asher (2007) concluded that pension funds 
are a cost-effective way of not only meeting financial needs at retirement, but also providing 
for members and dependants in the event of any of the risk events occurring. This is because 
in addition to saving for retirement, pension funds may also include a cost-effective way of 
insuring the risks mentioned either through the fund or via an external insurer. The ability to 
cover most of the risk events makes membership and contribution into a pension fund 
attractive for most individuals.  
However, a pension fund is only as good as its ability to meet the needs of its 
members adequately, or to the full measure of their expectation. Groyer and Holtzhausen 
(2006) discussed the difference between the objectively projected benefits given saving levels 
and expected returns, and the retirement benefit that is anticipated by the member. They 
found that a gap exists between what the pension fund will provide at retirement and what the 
member expects it to provide. The implications are inadequate retirement savings, as no 
additional assets are kept to meet retirement needs. Further to this, if no remedial action is 
taken over the working life-time to cover this gap the result is the same. 
In order to close the gap between member expectation and actual fund provision, the 
researcher suggests two primary questions the member must be able to answer. These are: 
1. How much do I need to fund for my retirement? This sets a goal or target benefit that 
the member aims for. It also gives a measure through which current savings can be 
compared to see if they will meet the required benefit. This measure is usually given 
as the net replacement ratio
2
 of the fund benefit. Old Mutual (2012) found that the net 
replacement ratio was a key measure used in the industry to project retirement 
benefits. This measure is commonly understood by pension fund members, but has its 
own drawbacks. As an example, the net replacement ratio only refers to income 
                                                          
2
 Net replacement ratio is defined as the annualised monthly income in the month following the retirement 
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immediately after retirement. As income requirements in the years subsequent to the 
retirement date are expected to vary, an appropriate annuity factor that takes this into 
account should be used. This, however, is not always available (Butler, 2011). 
2. How much have I saved so far? Whilst most members will have a general idea of the 
monetary value of their savings, few will know what it represents in relation to their 
targeted benefit. Sunden (2006) stated that members of a pension fund are likely to 
over-estimate what their pension benefits will be. This is because the value of their 
total share of fund is large when compared with their monthly income, but is actually 
small when spread over fifteen to twenty years in retirement. It is only in relation to 
the target benefit that any meaningful analysis of the adequacy of what has been saved 
to date can be done. 
2.2 The state of retirement funding in South Africa 
We now consider how the retirement industry in South Africa has fared with regard to benefit 
adequacy. Masilela (2011a) estimated that most South Africans will retire with a replacement 
ratio of less than 30%. Facer and Reynolds (2010) suggest that there are three main issues to 
building adequate retirement savings. These are: 
1. contributing at least 15% to 18% of salary; 
2. achieving modest returns over your working life-time; and, 
3. starting to save early. 
The prevalence of inadequate funding, however, suggests that these have not been 
fully implemented. This may be due to members being unable to afford to contribute at 
higher rates due to low salaries or debts being serviced (Chiroro, 2010). Returns on 
investments may also be consistently low over a long period of time. This is a danger for 
members whose funds allow investment choice. Where inadequate information is provided on 
what returns a member should target given their age and contribution rates, investment 
choices that fail to meet targets can be made. The information that is provided to members 
may affect the decisions that they make regarding how much they contribute into the pension 
fund, and the portfolios they invest in. Members can also be informed on the dangers of non-
preservation of benefits over their working life-time. This research will consider the effect of 
information provided to members of defined contribution pension funds on decision-making 
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2.3 Bridging the gap between the actual and anticipated benefit in a pension fund 
In order to bridge the gap between actual and anticipated retirement benefits, it is important 
that a member is educated, and regularly communicated with, to shape his benefit expectation 
correctly. Michael Pomery, a former president of the Institute of Actuaries, made the 
following statement in his inaugural address: “The biggest challenge for actuaries will be the 
need to communicate with individual members rather than with employers or trustees as we 
have been used to doing” (Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006). This comment was made with 
specific reference to defined contribution funds. It is interesting to note that in a trustee 
survey conducted in the UK, where trustees were asked to list their roles and contribution to a 
pension fund, the issue of member communication does not arise as being important 
(Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Kouzmin, 2003). 
2.4 The research problem 
This paper considers how the information provided to members of defined contribution 
pension funds affects the way they fund for their retirement. The author considers the failure 
of many pension fund members to achieve benefit adequacy by the time they retire, and seeks 
to research whether increasing the quality and quantity of information provided to defined 
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3 Background 
3.1  A brief history 
Pension funds are designed to provide for the wellbeing of an individual on his retirement 
and at other times of transition during his working life-time. Bodie (1989) suggested that 
pension funds can be seen as a form of retirement insurance. There are two main types of 
pension funds in operation: 
1. Defined Benefit (DB) Fund - this is where the benefit to a member, in relation to final 
salary, is known in advance, and the employer or sponsor of the fund bears the cost of 
ensuring that the member receives the full benefit promised to them.  
2. Defined Contribution (DC) Fund – this is where the contribution made by the 
employer and the member is determined in advance and the member receives the 
accumulated value of these contributions on retirement. The benefit is therefore 
dependent on many factors, amongst them the investment return earned on the fund 
assets. 
In recent years there has been a shift from DB funds to DC funds. This move was 
initially brought about by pressure from bargaining councils (Barrientos, 2002). This was in 
response to the inequalities of DB funds which did not provide fair withdrawal values when 
an employee moved jobs (Andrew, 2004). This issue has subsequently been dealt with 
through the Pension Funds Second Amendment Act (2001) in South Africa. Members were 
also readily willing to accept a switch to a defined contribution arrangement as markets were 
performing very well, and they could share in the higher returns directly in a DC arrangement 
(Andrew, 2004). Access to surplus held in the DB fund was a further motivating factor for the 
move to a DC arrangement, as some of the surplus would be used to provide a sweetener to 
the conversion values used (Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006). 
There has been a continued movement to DC funds even after investment returns 
lowered in subsequent years, and the issue of poor withdrawal benefits in DB arrangements 
had been dealt with. Facer and Reynolds (2010) suggested that in the United Kingdom this 
was due to deteriorating balance sheets of employers, markets’ reaction to the reduction of 
social security benefits and asset allocation limits set by the regulator, which were more 
stringent for DB funds. More recently the global financial crisis has made the de-risking of 
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becoming closed to new members and a faster move to DC arrangements (Faculty of 
Actuaries Students Society, 2010).  
Pension funds have specific rules that determine what proportion the employer 
contributes, and what the employee contributes. It had been proposed that from March 2012 
the employer’s contributions on pension funds would be treated as a fringe benefit in the 
hands of the employee. The tax deductible portion of the employees’ contribution would 
increase to 22.5% of taxable income. These changes would have encouraged pension fund 
structures that maximise the new tax structure, resulting in funds changing their rules to 
remove the employer contribution and increasing the member contribution to optimise the tax 
benefit for members. The lack of an employer contribution would then be offset by a 
proportional increase in salary. Whilst both DB and DC structures allow for the full 
contribution to be made by the employee, after the required rule changes have been made, 
and thus be tax-efficient, the DB structure would still require the employer to fund any 
deficits that arise, and these would be taxed as a fringe benefit in the hands of the employee. 
As a result, DB structures could become less attractive to employees if the proposal is 
adopted in its current form. These changes to the tax structure of pension fund contributions 
could further accelerate the move to DC funds (NMG News Watch, 2011). The Revenue 
authority and the South African National Treasury are considering how the tax rules can be 
amended to create an exemption from the treatment of employer contribution as a fringe 
benefit, thus making them tax deductible to a limit for select DB funds (National Treasury, 
2012a). 
3.2  The retirement liability 
Individuals will have an idea of the future costs they will incur and need to fund for. 
Examples of these include debt or mortgage repayments, college tuition for their children and 
their day-to-day expenses. Some of these can be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, whereby 
they are met when they arise out of the current income stream. Others have to be funded over 
a longer period of time. Expenses post-retirement are one such cost. This cost can be viewed 
as a liability
3
 that an individual holds which must be funded for over their working lifetime. 
An individual is likely to target a benefit that maintains his current standard of living post-
                                                          
3
 We have used the term liability to reflect the full amount required by an individual on their retirement in 
order to maintain the same standard of living post-retirement as in pre-retirement. This liability will therefore 
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retirement, hence the need to save in order to provide an adequate income when no longer 
working.  
Of particular importance in this discussion is the costs brought about by the financial 
needs of members at retirement. In this instance, we have used the term liability to mean the 
financial obligation an individual has to fund for their day-to-day living expenses if they are 
not to become dependent on the state or extended family members. Every individual will 
have this obligation and can fund it through a pension fund or rely on government social 
security schemes to supplement their savings. Alternatively, it can be funded through other 
savings vehicles. The full value of this cost is dependent on the member’s particular needs at 
retirement and life expectancy. It is therefore important for individuals to know what 
proportion of the total post retirement costs they have transferred or funded for. 
Under the DB arrangement, there is a clear definition of the liability that the fund 
holds with regard to its members. In exchange for a contribution from the member, or his 
employer, the fund assumes the member’s retirement liability in respect of the value of the 
benefit as defined in the rules. The member will have essentially transferred his retirement 
liability in part or in full to the pension fund, depending on the level of benefit provided 
compared to the member’s needs at retirement. The fund will now have an obligation to cover 
a certain level of the member’s retirement liability as agreed and the member will need to 
only save for the liability over and above that covered by the fund. This means that if 
individuals know they will require a net replacement ratio of 80 per cent of their final salary 
to retire comfortably, and their pension fund provides 60 per cent, they will know well in 
advance to save for the remaining 20 per cent. 
When a DB fund is valued, the holder of the liability, in this case the fund through its 
sponsor, is given a clear monetary value of the liability it holds for each member. Each time a 
valuation is performed, the liability holder knows how much he needs to set aside in reserve 
today to meet his future obligations as they arise, given specified assumptions about future 
experience. This allows for a definite target to be set with regard to the assets backing the 
liability, the investment strategies to be employed and the contribution rates by the employer. 
The member in this fund will also be communicated with and informed about the current 
level of liability he has transferred to the fund, as the benefit statement will include the 
pension annuity to which the member is entitled
4
.  
                                                          
4
 The DB fund valuation will, in reality, be more complex than this. We have only considered the valuation in 
relation to the liability held by the employer and the benefit due to the member. Other issues including asset 
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Under the DC arrangement the member retains his retirement liability, and the fund 
acts as a savings vehicle through which the member can save for his retirement. This means 
the member is not guaranteed any level of benefit other than what he and his employer have 
contributed and the return earned on that. When a DC fund is valued, the fund’s liabilities are 
taken to be equal to the contributions made into that fund, plus the return on the fund assets 
less the expenses. The members are provided with benefit statements
5
 that specify the benefit 
on exit. This value is what the member has accumulated and is not linked to the retirement 
liability that he currently holds. In addition, this value does not always inform the member, 
who in this case also holds the liability, whether he has enough set aside in reserve (his share 
of fund) to meet his future retirement liability. This usually results in the member over-
estimating the value of what he has saved (Sunden, 2006). The information provided is not 
always sufficient for financial planning, and therefore not a good guide for decision-making 
(Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006).  
There is a clear difference in the reporting standards between the two arrangements. A 
DC fund member may not get the full information required to know if he is on track to 
meeting his retirement goals. Groyer and Holtzhausen (2006) suggest that DC funds should 
be treated as individual member DB funds and the valuation report include information 
relating to how far the member has gone towards meeting his retirement goals and what rate 
he should be contributing at to stay on track.  
Another important point to consider is that of the member’s reasonable benefit 
expectation, which is what the average member expects to receive based on the information 
they have at hand and the past practice of the pension fund. In a DB fund this will be created 
by the rules of the fund and the projections given on benefit statements. Under a DC fund, the 
rules will specify how the member’s benefit is to be determined on retirement and 
withdrawal. However, how well this benefit is likely to meet retirement needs is not 
communicated. This means members may have final benefit expectations related to either 
past benefits given under DB funds (Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006) or what they hope their 
accumulated share of fund will be able to purchase at retirement. This may not be met in 
some instances. 
                                                          
5
 DC fund benefit statements usually show the following information: 
 Personal details 
 Benefit on all forms of retirement and withdrawal as a lump-sum 
 Insured benefits e.g. on death or disability 
In addition some statements will also show the projected net replacement ratio given the member’s 
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The move from DB to DC pension funds means that investment risk is transferred to 
the members from the employer (Masilela, 2011a). However, where there is insufficient 
knowledge and training, this risk is unlikely to be managed as well by a member in a DC 
arrangement as by the employer or sponsor in a DB arrangement. When an employer retains 
the investment risk constant reviews are done to ensure the returns earned are in line with 
what is required to meet the retirement obligation in full. Additionally, the fund will hold 
solvency reserves and margins as a cushion against adverse investment experience. 
Contribution rates are set by the actuary to ensure the fund can meet the final obligation at 
retirement. When the fund is valued, any shortfalls that may have arisen due to lower than 
expected returns are then funded by the employer via an increased contribution or a lump-
sum payment into the fund.  
However, in a DC fund, where the member holds the investment risk, lower than 
expected returns will not necessarily be funded through an increased contribution rate 
(Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006) or a lump-sum payment at each valuation date, as the legal 
liability of the DC fund is always equal to the value of the assets held. It is assumed (or 
hoped) that higher returns in later years will compensate for any underperformance in earlier 
years. This is especially risky where an individual is close to retirement, and the time for such 
smoothing to occur is short.  
3.3  Legislative, Regulatory and Professional Guidance 
The issue of communication to members of a pension fund has been addressed to some extent 
by regulation and professional guidance. Circular PF130 of the Financial Services Board 
(2007) states the minimum standards of communication required for stakeholders of a 
pension fund, particularly members and trustees. In particular, the circular states that a 
pension fund should have a communication policy that governs how it communicates with its 
members and other beneficiaries. The communication is required to be appropriate, timely, 
useful, informative and comprehensive among other attributes. The challenge lies with how 
one would judge the usefulness or comprehensiveness of information provided. National 
Treasury (2012c) has proposed that Circular PF130 become legally enforceable by the 
Registrar of Pension Funds. This may result in clearer standards on the communication policy 
for pension funds. 
UK professional guidance for actuaries requires that members of DC funds be 
provided with benefit illustrations. The Pensions Technical Actuarial Standards (TAS) 
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these benefit illustrations should include, allowing for appropriate assumptions that consider 
the economic outlook. The Pensions TAS is relevant locally as it is recommended practice for 
members of the Actuarial Society of South Africa. Among other features, this guidance 
requires the actuary providing projections to illustrate them such that the recipient can relate 
the benefit to his current income. The illustration must also be complete and balanced, 
include risk warnings and advise the member to receive regular illustrations. 
The TAS does not require the provision of benefit projections, but simply states the 
standard to be kept should these be provided. This means that while South African guidance 
endorses the guidelines provided in the Pensions TAS, there is no regulatory requirement for 
this projection to be done for DC members. However, in the UK the Occupational and 
Personal Pension Schemes Amendment Regulations (2002) requires that all members of 
personal pension schemes and other money purchase pension funds must be provided with 
illustrations of the annuity benefit they would receive in real terms. The Board of Actuarial 
Standards issued the Technical Memorandum TM1: Statutory Money Purchase Illustrations 
to show what is required in these illustrations
6
 as it is not covered by the Pensions TAS. 
The Financial Services Board Circular PF86 (1996) gives a minimum standard of 
what is required to be disclosed to members on their benefit statements and how frequently 
these must be produced. This standard, however, is lacking in respect of communication to 
DC members, especially when compared to the requirements of the UK regulation. The 
circular requires that members be told how their retirement or withdrawal benefit will be 
constituted, which for most DC funds is the member’s share of fund as at the date of 
retirement or other such withdrawal. While this gives the DC member a clear picture of how 
his benefit is calculated, it does little to help the member realise how much of his retirement 
liability is currently catered for by the fund or what his current share of fund could amount to 
at retirement or as an annuity. This makes the information provided inappropriate for 
decision-making and risk assessment as is required of individual members of a DC fund.  
Mr Charles Pillai, the former Pension Funds adjudicator brought this to light in the 
Principal Officers Association Annual Conference (Maxim, 2010), when he commented that 
there existed a communication gap between the fund and its members. He highlighted the 
need for better quality information to members and suggested that good communication was 
                                                          
6
 The aim of the statutory money purchase illustrations is to assist individuals in assessing the adequacy of 
their pension arrangements, the extent to which they need to make further provision and the uncertainty 
involved in the illustrations provided. Statutory money purchase illustrations specify limits on some of the 
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more than just sending benefit statements to members, but could lead to better management 
of member expectations and as a result reduced litigation between the fund and its members. 
This opinion reflected the spirit of the ruling of Wentworth vs. GG Umbrella 
Provident Fund (2009), when the adjudicator stated that Circular PF86 was inadequate and 
not up to the standards of its UK and USA counterparts with regard to the minimum 
information that members must be given in benefit statements (Pension Funds Adjudicator, 
2007). No action has been taken as yet to improve the regulation on what constitutes adequate 
minimum information to be provided to members of DC funds. 
There is a need for the regulatory authorities, professional bodies and industry forums 
in South Africa to reassess their current requirements and make changes as is appropriate to 











Effect of information on decision-making for members of DC pension funds Page 18 
 
4 Literature Review 
The issue of the inadequacy of retirement provision in DC schemes has been researched by 
many authors. Many reasons have been identified for inadequate provisioning. The literature 
below identifies a number of factors which contribute to inadequate retirement saving, 
namely: 
 inadequate contributions over the working life-time; 
 non-participation in pension funds and apathy of current members; 
 non- preservation of benefits upon withdrawal prior to retirement; 
 the effect of default options on member choice; 
 behavioural biases; and  
 social factors. 
We will consider the literature on each of these factors. In addition we will consider solutions 
that have been provided to encourage better retirement saving, and how the information 
provided to members of DC funds can be part of the solution. 
4.1 Inadequate Contributions  
The rate at which pension contributions are made is a primary contributory factor to benefit 
adequacy (Facer and Reynolds, 2010). In defined contribution funds this rate is usually fixed 
according to the rules of the fund for both the member and the employer. For some funds the 
member can choose the rate he wants to contribute at, within a specified band. These rates 
are, however, not reviewed as often as is optimal to ensure benefit adequacy (Groyer and 
Holtzhausen, 2006). The result is that members tend to contribute at the same fixed level as 
per the fund rules even where these rates are inadequate. Most DC funds will also allow 
members to make additional voluntary contributions. These can be used to supplement 
contributions where the rate as stated in the rules is considered inadequate. However, only 
13% of members make additional voluntary contributions into their pension funds (Old 
Mutual, 2012). 
4.2 Non-Participation and Apathy 
Clearly, failing to participate in a pension fund at all is likely to be a major contributor to 
inadequate retirement provisioning. Internationally, the primary cause of non-participation in 
a pension fund has been found to be apathy (Hall and Floyd, 2009): most members had no 
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non-participation are a lack of understanding of the information provided to employees and 
complexity aversion, as the pension fund arrangement was seen to be hard to visualise when 
compared to a savings account or property investment. In South Africa it is estimated that 
80% of formally employed individuals participate in an occupational pension fund (Andrew, 
2004). The reasons for non-participation in the local market are mainly unemployment, 
temporary employment, unavailability of employer-sponsored pension schemes for small 
employers, and low earners whose pension benefits would be lower than available social 
grants (Andrew, 2004). Employers who offer pension funds will typically make membership 
compulsory for all employees. 
Apathy can be seen in members of pension funds who take little or no interest in their 
pension savings until it is too late. Byrne, Harrison and Blake (2007) describe such members 
as ‘reluctant investors’. In a survey of employees in the United Kingdom, Byrne (2004) found 
that many employees had limited knowledge of, and interest in their pension funds. The 
situation is no better in South Africa. Masilela (2011a) found that over two-thirds of members 
could not identify a trustee in their pension fund, whilst 43% had no idea how their fund 
assets were invested.  
4.3 Preservation of Pension Fund Benefits 
Preservation of members’ benefits during their working life-times between periods of 
unemployment or changes of employment is vital in ensuring retirement funding adequacy. 
However, the lack of an adequate social security net often results in members using up 
retirement savings during periods of unemployment. The proposed social security changes in 
South Africa included a compulsory requirement for members to preserve benefits rather than 
cash them out when changing employers. This possibility was mentioned in the 2011 Budget 
speech (Ministry of Finance, 2011). National Treasury (2012b) has also proposed new rules 
and options to allow members to preserve a greater proportion of their savings. These include 
allowing for partial withdrawals, increasing tax on withdrawals as a disincentive to take out a 
cash benefit, setting a default preservation fund for all withdrawals, setting a maximum 
income withdrawal per month for those who cannot find alternative employment and 
requiring full preservation of benefits on withdrawal. 
Groyer and Holtzhausen (2006) suggested that a contributing factor to the lack of 
benefit preservation in South Africa was a lack of understanding of what one’s retirement 
needs will be, and therefore a reduced concern over the member’s ability to meet these needs. 
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unable to act in their own best interests with regard to retirement savings and preservation of 
those savings. It was also noted that when deciding whether to preserve a benefit the 
decisions are increasingly linked to guidance or advice received (Old Mutual, 2012). This 
highlights the importance of member communication that serves to equip the individual with 
adequate information for decision-making.  
4.4 Behavioural Biases: Effect of Default Options 
Another important issue is that of default options in pension funds. Bershears, Choi, Laibson 
and Madrian (2008) observed that whilst it would appear rational for an individual in a 
default option that fails to maximise his utility to move out of that option to a better option, 
this is not always seen in practice, as shown by the evidence of inertia among members in 
sub-optimal default options in their pension funds.  
Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2001) found that pension fund members tend to 
make choices that require the least effort on their part. This is mainly seen where a pension 
fund offers choice for members but has a default option which is automatic for those who do 
not make a choice. For example, where a default contribution rate exists, members are more 
likely to choose this rather than tailor their contribution rates to suit their needs. Members are 
also less likely to vary these rates with changing circumstances as this requires them to make 
an active decision. 
Brown and Weisbenner (2007) suggest that the default option given to members is 
sometimes seen as advice on the best or most appropriate option for the average member and 
taken on by members even though it may be unsuitable. 
4.5 Other Behavioural Biases 
Hedesstron, Svedsater and Garling (2006) found evidence to suggest that there is a negative 
correlation between member involvement in a pension fund and the tendency to choose the 
default option. This would suggest that the choice of a default option is linked to member 
apathy. Their study also found that the members who were more actively involved in their 
pension funds were the older or wealthier members. This seems to suggest that members only 
consider the decisions regarding their retirement when they are older, by which time it may 
be too late, or when they have accumulated a fair amount of money to have a reason to worry 
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Individuals in pension funds are also known to suffer from the effects of heuristics
7
. 
Brown and Weisbenner (2007) found that members do not always choose the pension 
structure that gives them the best long-term benefit. In their study of the pension fund choice 
in the State Universities Retirement System (SURS) in the USA, in which members can 
choose between a DB and DC structure, it was found that academic staff mainly chose a DC 
arrangement even though it did not give them the highest expected return. This was partly 
due to overconfidence in their ability to achieve higher than average returns in the market. 
Brown and Weisbenner (2007) also found that the prevailing economic climate affects the 
decisions made by members. This shows the short-term view taken by members in making 
long-term decisions. In bull runs new employees tend to choose the DC option as they 
assume returns currently being experienced will always be achieved. Similarly, in bear 
markets members tend to opt for the DB fund that reduces their exposure to investment risk. 
Van Dalen, Henkens, Koedjik and Slager (2010) studied the effect of behavioural 
biases on trustees of a pension fund. They presented vignettes, or short stories that model 
real-life situations, to trustees and asked them to make a decision for the fund. The vignettes 
were drawn from situations that were normally encountered by trustees and included 
increasing or decreasing pension benefits and contributions given differing macroeconomic 
conditions, or solvency positions. The trustees were found to suffer from loss aversion (when 
a person is more sensitive to losses rather than gains of the same magnitude) (Sun, 2009) and 
make decisions based on the actions of peers rather than what is required for the fund’s 
unique situation.  
Brown and Weisbenner (2007) suggest that a form of bounded rationality could be the 
reason behind the sub-optimal choices made by members with regard to their retirement 
saving. Todd and Gigerenzer (2003:144) define bounded rationality as “the notion of 
optimization under constraint or the sub-optimal outcome of our limited cognitive system”. 
Examples of the constraints that can act on a pension fund member are: 
1. The member may be unable to correctly assign risk to the different options he has. In 
the example of investment choice, a member may fail to understand how holding a 
significant proportion of his company’s stock will lead to high losses in the event of 
the company becoming bankrupt, as he loses both his job, and a significant proportion 
of his savings as the value of the stock held decreases. 
                                                          
7
 A heuristic is a “strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, 
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2. The member may also have incomplete information about the choices available to him 
or the consequences of these choices. 
3. The choices given or structure of the pension fund may be so complex that the 
member cannot understand them. An example is where complex derivatives are held 
by a fund. A member who cannot estimate the expected pay-off of these derivatives 
may make sub-optimal choices based on his incorrect valuation of what the derivative 
asset is really worth. Equally likely is the possibility of members sticking to the most 
basic asset classes that they understand well even when they are not likely to give the 
best return (Simon, 1972). 
The effect of naive diversification
8
 was discussed by Benartzi and Thaler (2001). It 
was further expanded by Choi et al. (2001) who showed that members on average held asset 
allocations which were similar to the average asset allocation of all the choice funds, e.g. if 
two-thirds of the funds are equities most individuals would also hold two-thirds of their 
individual share of the fund in equities. 
4.6 Social Factors 
Peer group pressure (Brown and Weisbenner, 2007) and other social factors (Duflo and Saez, 
2003) were also found to influence the choices made by members. J P Morgan (2010) 
suggested that social norms can affect behaviour to the extent that if people knew that their 
counterparts were saving, or saving more, they would be more inclined to do the same. The 
same argument, however, would exist where the norm is not to save. Individuals are 
psychologically comforted by being part of a majority in the same situation. Byrne, Harrison 
and Blake (2007), however, suggested that peer group comparisons, when given to members 
or trustees of a pension fund, can help those making erroneous decisions to revise them as 
they try to fall more in line with the industry average. When members are given information 
on what their peers are doing it can result in them aligning themselves with what most 
members are doing. Where most members are making decisions that result in better 
retirement provisioning then peer group comparisons may lead to better decisions by other 
members too. However, where most members are making poor choices peer group 
comparisons could result in members who would have made better choices without the 
comparison actually making poor choices in line with their peers. The effect of peer group 
comparisons where most members are making better decisions did not result in a significant 
                                                          
8
 Naïve diversification is the allocation of 1/n of the total wealth to each of the n available portfolios (Benartzi 
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increase in retirement provisioning in study by Duflo and Saez (2003). This suggests that 
peer group comparisons are not very effective when used to try and influence member 
decisions regarding their retirement provisioning. 
4.7 Recommendations to improve benefit adequacy  
The recommendations made in the literature can be split into three specific areas: 
1. Recommendations that seek to encourage active decision-making, and where 
decisions are currently being made, to improve these. 
2. Recommendations that seek to improve benefit adequacy by reducing the number of 
decisions that the member has to make or structuring the fund and its options such 
that member actions have a less negative effect. 
3. Recommendations that are a combination of the above. 
These are further discussed below. 
4.7.1 Recommendations encouraging active decision-making 
Brown and Weisbenner (2007) suggested that members may have difficulty processing the 
information given to them in the required time-frame leading to sub-optimal choices being 
made. In particular, this occurs where a member has to choose an investment option on 
joining a pension fund. Here a limited amount of time is given for member choices to be 
made. If the member has never had to make a similar decision, or if the information or 
choices presented are not easily understood, a decision will be taken based on what everyone 
else is doing, or on the little that has been understood. Such a decision can be inappropriate. 
The effects of such poor decision-making will then be further worsened by the inertia 
exhibited by most members when it comes to making any changes to their pension 
arrangements. In this case allowing adequate time and providing clearer information could 
improve decision-making. 
Groyer and Holtzhausen (2006) suggested that DC funds should be presented in 
relation to the member’s liability to put the benefits into the proper perspective. An example 
could be showing the annuity that can be purchased with the current value of the assets the 
member holds. DC funds often present their benefit statements in an assets framework 
whereby the members are told what assets they hold, but not what proportion of the liability 
they cover (e.g. as a replacement ratio of current salary or projected salary at retirement), and 
what the shortfall relative to their total required retirement benefit is. This paper builds on the 
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research into what constitutes adequate communication to the members of a pension fund. 
They also noted that the move to DC funds has left a communication gap that has yet to be 
filled. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2005) agreed that individuals fail to plan for retirement and to 
save adequately due to financial illiteracy. They suggested financial education as a tool to 
cause increased planning and saving for retirement.  
4.7.2 Recommendations that reduce the negative effects of member decisions 
Choi et al. (2001) found that members of a pension fund will choose the path or decision-
making process that requires the least effort from them. They suggested that to limit the 
negative effect of members choosing this path of least resistance, pension funds should be 
structured such that the easy path is a suitable and appropriate option for most. This is 
particularly relevant where the fund has options. Here the default option should represent the 
most suitable option. 
Choi et al. (2001) identified six institutional features in 401(K) plans (a type of DC 
plan commonly used in the USA) that could be used to ensure that the default option for 
members would be the most optimal. These are:  
1. Automatic enrolment into the fund/plan: this ensures that there is reduced apathy with 
regard to the decision to actually save for retirement or with regard to the time when 
one chooses to start saving for retirement. 
2. Automatic preservation: this would require a change in the policy for when a member 
leaves a fund. The option to preserve a benefit would be the default for members even 
where the benefit is not that large. The possibility of compulsory preservation is 
currently under consideration in South Africa. 
3. Automatic contribution increases, such as the Save More Tomorrow (SMaRT) plan 
introduced by Thaler and Benartzi (2004), which is further discussed in section 4.7.3. 
4. Company matching contributions to encourage increased saving: this is done in some 
funds in South Africa, but may be removed in light of the changing tax legislation. 
5. Presentation of asset allocation options to encourage optimal choice, including the use 
of reasonable defaults. 
6. Financial education at the work-place. 
Facer and Reynolds (2010) reiterated some of the suggestions above, but also 
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structure, including the contribution structure and default options, to ensure the fund remains 
relevant over time.  
Byrne, Harrison and Blake (2007) suggested the use of target dates of retirement to 
determine an investment horizon that then inform investment objectives. This is where a 
member chooses a target date to retire and the investment manager makes the appropriate 
investment decisions with that target date in mind. This helps remove the effect of inertia in 
apathetic members who would fail to make the appropriate asset allocations at the relevant 
points in time. It would also help to ensure that the member does not make inappropriate 
asset allocations based on short-term market movements. A similar approach, more common 
to South African pension funds is life-cycle investing, whereby members’ assets are moved 
into less volatile portfolios as they approach retirement age. 
Benartzi and Thaler (2007) criticised the assumption that individuals are able to 
choose the optimal savings or retirement plan, and have the will-power to act on this optimal 
plan. The authors argue that the passive and naive decisions made by pension fund members 
are as a result of insufficient knowledge to make the best decision. They suggested changes to 
the design of funds and the use of sensible default options. Furthermore, the authors 
suggested choice architecture, which is structuring of choices to members that is designed to 
influence members’ choices to the optimal ones. 
JP Morgan (2010) agreed with this stance. They argued that the design of DC pension 
funds assumes that pension fund members are able to make the choices that maximise their 
benefit at retirement, which is not always true. They further stated that low participation and 
contribution rates and inappropriate asset allocations prove this. They concluded that when 
given total freedom of choice, members may fail to make the best decision, and may regret 
their choice later. They proposed using behavioural theories in the communication and 
training of members to guide them in making more rational choices regarding their retirement 
saving. 
Byrne, Harrison and Blake (2007) suggested what they call ‘targeted communication’ 
where members are given the information that is relevant to their specific situation, e.g. 
members approaching retirement are given literature highlighting the need to move to less 
volatile asset classes as they near retirement. 
4.7.3 Recommendations that combine the two methods 
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) suggest that members are more inclined to make a decision about 
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They found that members who agreed to save proportions of their salary increases in the 
future ended up contributing more towards retirement. They called this approach “Save More 
Tomorrow” (SMaRT). This can be compared with the findings of Choi et al. (2001) that 
whilst increasing the level of member education increased the resolution to save more, it did 
not cause a significant increase in saving as members were still quite reluctant to make active 
choices with regard to their pension investing.  
Further study by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) proved this over a three-year period 
where members enrolled in the SMaRT programme increased contributions from 3.5% to 
11.6% compared to those who only received education, whose contribution rate only 
increased to 8.7% of salary from 4.4% over the same period. This suggests that the active and 
recorded decision to increase contribution levels at a future date, without further consultation, 
resulted in an increased contribution. Members would passively not change their earlier 
decision to save more towards retirement when their salary increases came through. This is 
an example of a solution that encourages decision-making when the immediate impact to the 
member will not be felt, then takes advantage of the passive nature of pension fund members 
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5 Methodology and design 
This research considers whether the problem of a lack of adequate retirement saving could be 
alleviated by changing the quality and quantity of information provided to pension fund 
members. The following research methodologies were considered: 
1. Use of past data. This approach was used by Brown and Weisbenner (2007). It 
involves considering past decisions made given varying circumstances, and drawing 
conclusions based on these. This method is limited by the amount of past information 
that is available, and is unsuitable for this study, as very little has been gathered 
regarding pension fund members’ decision-making, given different levels of 
information in South Africa. 
2. Case study. This approach was used by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) when they 
researched the SMaRT programme. If used in this research, this would require the 
members of pension funds to be observed over a period and the decisions that they 
make recorded. A control group would be set that would be given the basic 
information. The decisions made by the control would then be compared to those 
made by members with additional information. This method, however, is unsuitable 
due to the long nature of the experimental process. In addition, it may be considered 
intrusive by trustees or members, as actual member choices are analysed. The 
members in the control group would also be disadvantaged by the limited information 
provided to them. 
3. Surveys. This method is the most common one used in the literature cited. It allows 
the research to be conducted in a reasonable time frame. In addition, it allows for a 
control group to be set without disadvantaging any of the participants. Trustees are 
also more likely to agree to this method of research as it does not analyse actual 
decisions being made in the pension fund. This is the method of collecting data that 
was chosen for this research. 
5.1 Surveys 
Surveys can be conducted through various methods, including questionnaires and interviews. 
Interviews can be conducted face to face or telephonically, whilst questionnaires are usually 
done via post, email or web-based methods.  
Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) observed that surveys may give less reliable 
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inappropriate sampling, a survey design that uses one method where another would have been 
more accurate and the purpose for which the survey is to be used, which will determine a 
particular method’s suitability.  
Alexander and Becker (1978) gave similar opinions with regard to questionnaires and 
interviews. They attributed the poor reliability of responses to the nature of most 
questionnaires, which is quite abstract and sometimes vague. This results in different 
interpretations and biased or inappropriate responses. Pinsonneault and Kramer (1993) 
suggested ways to improve the quality of data obtained through surveys by choosing a survey 
method that best suits the particular research being done. Vignettes are one such method. 
5.2 Vignettes 
Hughes (1998) described vignettes as stories that can be used to point to a particular factor in 
the attitude and thinking of individuals. A survey that uses vignettes in its methodology will 
present participants with one or more scenarios based on a fictional character. The 
respondents may then be asked to predict the likely behaviour of the character given his or 
her particular circumstances. Some studies may go further, and ask the respondents to state 
how they would behave if they found themselves in a similar situation. The stories can be 
actual situations respondents typically experience, the findings of earlier research, or 
alternatively they can be generated by professionals in the particular field of study. The 
distinguishing feature of vignettes is that they offer detachment or a personal distance from 
the situation at hand, allowing participants to respond freely and without fear (Johnson, 
Newton, Jiwa and Goyder, 2005).  
Alexander and Becker (1978) noted that vignettes contain references to the factors 
that are most important or being researched, leading to more standard questions that are 
similarly interpreted by the respondents. As a result, vignettes tend to reduce ambiguity in 
survey questions and provide better focus on the particular factor being investigated. 
Vignettes can be used in interviews and questionnaires to reduce the negative effects of the 
chosen method on the quality of data obtained. 
Vignette responses can give more reliable results than direct surveys that ask a “what 
would you do” type question, where the responses include choices that are not considered 
socially responsible. McKegany, Abel, Taylor, Frischer, Goldberg, and Green (1995) 
observed that among a group of drug users, vignette responses show that respondents may be 
more inclined to borrow needles from other users as compared to what they reported to be 
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more frequently than the respondents reported themselves as doing. This characteristic of 
vignette responses is however limited as unacceptable behaviour is still under-reported. In 
another study of violence in dating relationships, Carlson (1996) found that when using 
vignettes, respondents tend to under-report violence compared with the actual statistics. The 
two studies can be interpreted to mean respondents are more likely to report socially 
unacceptable behaviour in vignettes than direct surveys, but that the responses will still not 
fully mirror actual occurrence of the unacceptable behaviour which may remain under-
reported. Vignettes therefore are likely to be a better survey tool than direct surveys; however 
they do not remove all bias due to under-reporting of socially unacceptable behaviour. 
Saving adequately for retirement may be viewed as a socially responsible ideal. As a 
result, reporting one’s personal financial mismanagement may be seen to portray a negative 
self-image. When asked to answer survey questions regarding contributing more or 
increasing activism in one’s pension fund so as to meet retirement needs most members will 
report a willingness to do so. This reported behaviour is, however, not seen over time. This is 
consistent with the findings of Choi et al. (2001) that showed member education and 
resolution to save more did not result in a significant increase in contributions.  
This suggests that respondents may subconsciously seek to portray themselves in the 
best light when directly answering surveys, which can lead to the results of a survey being 
inconsistent with observed behaviour. Vignettes offer respondents a way out of this dilemma 
by introducing a fictitious character whose behaviour is not connected to theirs. However, 
some self-preservation is still retained by the respondent even in a vignette survey. Further 
personal interaction with the respondent would be required to get more truthful responses 
(Barter and Renold, 1999). This follow-up post survey was not done in this study. 
Vignettes are better suited to research where the behaviour of a group of individuals 
under different scenarios is being investigated (Alexander and Becker, 1978). This allows 
them to be used to predict the behaviour of a group of people in a particular situation 
(Newsted, Huff and Munro, 1998). 
Vignettes will usually offer an individual a very specific situation, devoid of other 
extenuating circumstances that can and do appear in real life. The researcher can then limit 
the response to the particular factor being investigated. Newsted, Huff and Munro (1998) 
stated that surveys allow the researcher to see the effect of different factors in the decision-
making process. This was successfully shown by Rettinger, Jordan and Peschiera (2004) in 
their research of the factors that cause cheating in students. Through the use of vignettes they 










Effect of information on decision-making for members of DC pension funds Page 30 
 
affect the likelihood of cheating differently. Whilst this particular trait of vignettes may be 
favourable, their specific nature can cause other negative issues to arise. Parkinson and 
Manstead (1993) argued that the emotion that is generated when responding to a vignette is 
not representative of how the individual would feel should the situation be real. This is 
because each person will have many other factors affecting their emotions and behaviour that 
can lead to a different decision than that reported in the vignette. 
5.2.1 Limitations of Vignettes 
Though highly praised as an effective research tool, vignettes, like any other research 
method, are subject to certain limitations and biases. Poor response rates are one of the 
greatest limitations of survey research (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1993), including the 
vignette method. This is usually due to lack of motivation of the respondents (Phipps, Butani 
and Chun, 1995) and can result in inaccurate data due to a small sample being used. There is 
a significant risk with this research as members of pension funds are generally seen to show a 
low level of participation and interest (Old Mutual 2012). Many researchers have sought to 
reduce this effect by incentivising respondents through lotteries or other free gifts on 
participation. Porter and Whitcomb (2003), however, argued that the research and literature 
suggest that lottery and other incentives have little or no impact on response rates. 
Vignettes will only measure the reported action of the respondent and not the actual 
action that will be taken should a similar situation arise (Eifler, 2007). It is then difficult to 
measure how the reported actions compare with the actual actions. In this research, members 
of pension funds may report increased positive behaviour like saving from the improved level 
of information that is provided, but this does not necessarily mean they would act similarly 
when the information is finally given. To gain further knowledge into how intentions relate to 
actual actions further research would be required, in particular through the use of case studies 
(Eifler, 2007). 
In light of the above, it is important to consider how reliable vignettes are as a 
research tool. Peabody, Luck, Glassman, Dresselhaus and Lee (2000) researched the 
difference between responses obtained using vignettes and other survey sources to determine 
the quality of healthcare offered by a group of doctors. They found that vignette responses 
from physicians were very similar to the results obtained from using the actual experience of 
trained actors who posed as patients and measured the quality of care provided. The authors 
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In a study involving vignettes, it is important that the questions asked be neutral and 
not designed to sway members towards a particular result. The questions and the study must 
not induce panic or other undesirable effects on members, especially those who will be close 
to retirement with clearly inadequate savings. These matters were given adequate 
consideration in the design and implementation of the study. 
5.2.2 Design of the vignettes and analysis of results 
In order to see the effect of a particular factor on decision-making using vignettes, the 
questions or scenarios must be structured appropriately. Barter and Renold (1999) offer 
issues to consider in the design of vignettes. These include ensuring that the stories used are 
likely to occur in real life and should not include disastrous events or eccentric characters that 
can take the respondents’ concentration away from the factor being considered. The stories 
should also be readily understood without being complex.  Another important consideration 
will be the sample to be used. This must be representative of the p pulation. In addition, the 
data to be collected should also be sufficient to allow meaningful statistical analysis.  
This research was conducted through surveys of members. A vignette study, similar to 
that used by Van Dalen et al. (2010) was applied. Em il invitations were sent to members of 
pension funds through the human resource departments of targeted companies or through 
personal contacts. The email contained a link to an online survey. 
The research presented three vignettes to participants. These vignettes offered 
participants choices relating to contribution rates and the option to preserve savings on 
retirement. These are two of the issues that were seen to affect benefit adequacy at retirement 
(Facer and Reynolds, 2010; Groyer and Holtzhausen, 2006). Each vignette had three 
treatments with different information in each. One treatment had standard information and 
the others provided additional information. The participants were presented with randomly 
selected vignettes, but did not have the same vignette in two or more forms (i.e. they only 
answered one out of the three treatments of each vignette and did not see the other two 
treatments). Each treatment contained incremental information, but gave the same answer 
options. The responses obtained showed how the decisions made differ when members are 
provided with additional information. The data obtained from the vignettes were analysed 
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5.3 Target sample and survey distribution methodology 
The survey was conducted on the members of pension funds via the employer, and also 
through personal contacts who are members of defined contribution pension funds. An email, 
which contained a brief explanation of the research and a link to the web-based survey, was 
sent to the participants. The survey was voluntary and permission was sought from the 
employer where the survey was sent company-wide. A lottery for 4 Pick’n Pay vouchers of 
R500 was conducted to offer incentive for participating in the survey. Participants were 
drawn from manufacturing, construction, financial services, retail and marine services 
companies. The survey participation per employer is summarised in the table below.  
 
Table 5.1: Breakdown of participants 
 
 
Response rates have been calculated where the total numbers of invitations to 
participate in the survey are known. It can be seen that response rates are quite low for most 
companies. There were 176 respondents who finished the survey to the end, though not all 
questions were answered. For the purposes of this research we have excluded those responses 
which were not completed in full to avoid double counting if a member attempts the survey 
again.  
  
Employer Respondents Response rate
CSC 35 15%
Nova Group 6 4%
NMG 28 47%
Power Group 23 6%
Distell 38 n/a
V & A Waterfront 15 n/a
AGS Movers 6 n/a
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6 Survey Findings: Description, Analysis and Synthesis 
This research seeks to consider whether improving the quality and quantity of information 
provided to members of pension funds is likely to positively affect the quality of decisions 
they make with regard to their retirement funding, and consequently result in improved 
retirement benefit adequacy. The research surveyed members of defined contribution pension 
funds. The full set of survey questions used can be found in Appendix A of this report. 
The survey was run over a period of six months. A total of 165 participants completed 
the survey, although not all answered the questions in full. An initial pilot survey was run 
prior to this period using the exact same method and survey questions on eleven individuals. 
No changes were made to the survey after this pilot. The results have been analysed showing 
the responses from the survey including the pilot study. We have chosen to use the combined 
results as they introduce no bias to the results but increase the sample size for more reliable 
statistical inference. A summary of the demographic information of the respondents is 
provided in Appendix B.  
All statistical tests have been done at the 5% level of significance for strong evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis, and at the 10% level for weak evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis. The analysis for each question has been conducted and presented separately 
below. 
6.1 Results for question 1 
This question asks members how much a 25 year old woman would choose to contribute into 
the pension fund. Treatment A gives information on the employer contribution rate of 5% and 
the allowable range of choices of 5%, 7% or 10%. Treatment B gives the same information as 
treatment A, but also adds that most members contribute 7% into their pension fund. 
Treatment C gives the same information as in Treatment B, but also informs the respondent 
that the typical member needs to contribute between 7% and 10% of salary to adequately 
provide for retirement. The respondents were randomly assigned either treatment A, B or C, 
and had the option to choose between a 5%, 7% or 10% contribution rate, based on the 
information given in their treatment. The table overleaf shows the responses received for 
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Table 6.1 – Responses to question 1. 
 
 
The table above shows the number of responses for each of the treatments under 
question 1 and the proportions selecting each rate. The treatments were randomly assigned to 
the participants. There were, however, fewer allocations of responses to treatment B, which 
was not expected.  
It can be seen that a greater proportion of respondents chose the 5% contribution rate 
in treatment A than in treatment B, and in treatment B than in treatment C. This would 
suggest that the additional information led to fewer respondents selecting the lower 
contribution rate. The proportion who selected a 7% contribution rate was lower in treatment 
A than in treatment B, but higher in treatment B than in treatment C. This suggests that the 
additional information in treatment B results in more members selecting the typical rate of 
7%. The information in treatment C, however, resulted in an even higher contribution rate of 
10% being selected more often. We then used statistical methods to test the significance of 
these results. A one-way z-test to measure the difference in proportions was used. Yates 
continuity correction was considered but not used as an adequate number of responses were 
available in each cell. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in 
members’ decisions given different amounts of information. The alternative hypothesis is that 
the additional information causes decision-making which results in improved retirement 
provisioning. This is shown in Appendix C
9
. 
We first tested whether there was a significant difference in the proportions of 
members who choose the 5% contribution rate in each treatment. The z-test for each pair of 
treatments shows that we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level for each comparison 
where one of the treatments is A. There is no significant difference, however, in the 
proportion who select the 5% rate in the comparison between treatment B and C. This 
suggests that additional information above that provided in treatment A results in a 
significant decrease in members who select the lowest contribution rate. Additional 
                                                          
9
 Appendix C shows the full detail of all statistical tests carried out. 
A B C A B C
5% 32 11 12 47% 24% 19%
7% 19 28 32 28% 62% 51%
10% 17 6 19 25% 13% 30%
Total 68 45 63 100% 100% 100%
Contribution 
rate
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information for those who already had more than the basic information in treatment A does 
not result in a significant decrease in those selecting the 5% contribution rate. 
The results show that the proportion that select a 10% contribution rate actually 
decreases as additional information is provided from treatment A to treatment B. This 
illustrates the power of conformity with peers which results in an increased proportion 
selecting the 7% contribution rate in line with their peers’ actions. This suggests that 
providing information on the actions of peers is useful where peers are making better 
decisions than the member would have made on their own. Where peers are making worse 
decisions, the information could lead to a member selecting a lower rate than they would 
have chosen without this additional information. The reduction in those selecting the higher 
rate of 10% is however more than offset by the reduction in the proportion that select the 5% 
contribution rate in treatment B compared to treatment A.  
A third test was carried out to see whether the proportion of participants who chose 
the 7% contribution rate increased with increasing information. The results show that we 
have strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis for comparisons between treatments A and 
B and treatment A and C. There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis for 
comparisons between treatments B and C. Any additional information provided from that in 
treatment A results in a significant increase in members who choose the 7% contribution rate. 
 
6.2 Results for question 2 
This question presents a 50 year old male earning R100,000 a year and with R170,000 saved 
up in his retirement fund who is currently contributing 6% of his salary to the pension fund. 
Treatment A provides information on the allowable range of contribution rates, the current 
average contribution rate of peers and the required contribution rate to retire with adequate 
savings for a typical member. Treatment B provides additional information on the member’s 
required replacement ratio, and the projected replacement ratio at the member’s current 
contribution rate. Treatment C provides additional information on the contribution rate that 
would be required to allow the member to retire with his required replacement ratio. 
The respondents were randomly assigned either a treatment A, B or C, and had the 
option to choose a 5%, 6%, 9% or 12% contribution rate, based on the information given in 
their treatment.  
 














The table above shows that few members chose to reduce their contribution rate to 5% 
in any of the treatments. The proportion of respondents choosing to maintain the 6% 
contribution rate were higher in treatment A than in treatment B. Treatment C had the lowest 
proportion of respondents maintaining the same contribution rate of 6%. Treatment B has the 
highest proportion of members selecting the 9% contribution rate, and treatment C has the 
highest proportion selecting the 12% contribution rate.  
The effect of increasing the information can be seen more clearly when we group the 
contribution rates into the 5% and 6% group representing those who choose to decrease the 
rate of contribution or make no change, and the 9% and 12% rate, representing those who 
choose to increase their contribution rate. The adjusted table showing this alternative split is 
shown below. 
 
Table 6.3 – Condensed results for question 2 
 
 
The adjusted table above suggests that the additional information provided in 
treatment B results in an increase in the proportion choosing a higher contribution rate. The 
additional information in treatment C results in a decrease in the proportion that choose to 
lower or maintain their contribution rate, and an increase in those who choose to increase 
their contribution rate. Similar hypothesis tests to question 1 were run to test whether the 
differences in proportion were significant to base conclusions on. Appendix C shows a 
summary of the tests and results obtained. The results show that there is weak evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis when comparing treatments A and C. 
A B C A B C
5% 3 1 1 5% 2% 2%
6% 15 12 10 25% 22% 17%
9% 19 20 15 32% 37% 25%
12% 22 21 33 37% 39% 56%
59 54 59 100% 100% 100%
Contribution 
rate
Number of Responses % responses 
Treatment Treatment
A B C A B C
5% + 6% 18 13 11 31% 24% 19%
9% + 12% 41 41 48 69% 76% 81%
59 54 59 100% 100% 100%
Contribution 
rate
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A hypothesis test was run on the data to see whether the proportion that chooses to 
increase their contribution to 12% is significantly higher, given additional information. There 
is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis when comparing treatments A and C as well as 
B and C. This suggests that once we inform a member of how much they have saved and how 
far it falls short of their requirements, and also provide information regarding the steps that 
they can take to achieve their desired target benefit the result is a significant proportion of 
members choosing to contribute at a higher rate. This implies that we need to provide 
information that informs a member if they are not on track to meeting their retirement goals, 
and also information on any remedial actions that can be taken to approach their target 
benefits. 
6.3 Results for question 3 
This scenario presented a member who is changing employers and has R75,000 saved in his 
pension fund. He has the option of receiving this benefit as a transfer to his new employer’s 
pension fund, a partial transfer to the new fund and the remainder in cash, or the full benefit 
paid out to him in cash. Treatment A gives information on the options available to the 
member. Treatment B gives additional information on the effect of failing to preserve the 
benefit at retirement as compared to peers who do. Treatment C gives all the information in 
treatment B and also provides the member with the additional contribution rate to be made 
for the rest of his working life-time to make up for failing to preserve the benefit. In addition, 
the member is informed of the additional contributory service he would need to allow him to 
catch up with his counterparts who would have preserved their benefit. The latter is presented 
as a late retirement age. 
The respondents were randomly assigned either treatment A, B or C, and had the 
option of receiving their benefit as a full transfer, a partial transfer or a cash benefit. A 
decision was made based on the information given in the treatment. The table below shows 
the responses received for question 3.  
 
Table 6.4 – Results for question 3 
 
A B C A B C
Cash 18 3 5 30% 5% 9%
Partial 12 25 11 20% 42% 21%
Full 30 31 38 50% 53% 70%
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The responses tabulated above show that there is a decrease in the proportion of 
respondents who choose to take a cash benefit as additional information is provided from 
treatment A to treatment B. Information on the reduced benefit due to non-preservation 
results in a higher proportion of members choosing a partial transfer. There is therefore an 
increased proportion that preserves their benefit in treatment B compared to treatment A, 
although this is mainly in partial rather than full transfers. The similar response is seen when 
comparing treatment A and C. Any additional information from that provided in treatment B 
does not result in reduced proportion selecting cash. When more information is given on the 
actions that a member would need to take in order to make up for not taking a full transfer a 
higher proportion of respondents chose to transfer the full benefit to the new employer. This 
is seen from the higher proportion who choose to make a full transfer of their benefit in 
treatment C than in treatment B. 
The statistical tests show that the proportion of respondents who choose to take a cash 
benefit decreased significantly as information was added from treatment A to treatment B. 
This would also suggest that minimal information on the consequence of taking a cash benefit 
is adequate to reduce the proportion who take out a cash benefit. This, however, may not 
prove to be so in real life situations, especially where the option to take out a partial benefit is 
not provided.  
A more informative analysis would be to consider the total amount that is paid out as 
cash, and how this changes with the additional information. If we assume that a partial 
transfer will be 50% in cash and 50% transferred to the new fund, we can determine whether 
the additional information affects the proportion of those who choose to transfer their benefit 
rather than taking it in cash. The table below shows the condensed result allowing for an 
equal split between cash and full transfers in the partial transfers option. 
 
Table 6.5 – Condensed results for question 3 
 
 
The proportion that chooses to take their benefit in cash decreases as more 
information is provided. The z-test for the difference in proportions show that there is strong 
A B C A B C
Cash 24 15.5 10.5 40% 26% 18%
Transfer 36 43.5 43.5 60% 74% 74%
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evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no significant difference when comparing the 
proportion who choose to take a cash benefit between treatments A and B, as well as A and 
C. We, however, cannot reject the null hypothesis when comparing treatments B and C. This 
suggests that the information provided in treatment B is adequate to reduce those who choose 
a cash benefit and additional information may not be useful in deterring the remaining 
members who take a cash benefit.  
The statistical tests also show that there is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
for those that take the full transfer benefit when comparing treatments A and C as well as B 
and C. This suggests that the information provided in treatment C results in a greater 
proportion of members selecting to make a full transfer. 
6.4 Synthesis of results 
The results suggest that additional information provided to members of pension funds is 
likely to affect their decision-making. The following conclusions can be drawn from the 
results, subject to the constraints identified and discussed in section 6.5.  
Information relating to the decisions of peers alters the decisions made regarding the 
contribution rate. Where a member would have selected a lower contribution rate, the 
information on peers’ decisions led to a significantly higher proportion selecting the higher 
contribution in line with their peers. Where a member would have selected a higher 
contribution rate a significant proportion also chose to lower their contribution rate in line 
with the popular decision of their peers. This is in line with the findings of J P Morgan 
(2010), which indicate that when considering providing additional information to members of 
pension funds relating to their peers’ decisions, the benefit may only be derived if most peers 
make better than average decisions.  
Information relating to generally required contribution rates for benefit adequacy 
significantly changes the decisions made by members of pension funds. When provided with 
this information a greater proportion of participants choose a higher contribution than when 
this information is not provided. The proportion is also higher than when information on peer 
group actions is provided. This shows that it is better to provide data that guides the average 
member to make a better contribution rate decision than to provide the peer decisions. Choi et 
al. (2001) found that members choose options that require the least effort on their part. When 
a recommendation is provided regarding the optimal contribution rate members are likely to 
choose the recommendation as they would resist the effort of tailoring their contribution rates 
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Question 1 provided general information to the members. The results of question 2 
show what happens when the information provided is specific to the particular individual. 
The first treatment in question 2 gives general information, and the responses show that even 
when given general information some members will still choose to reduce their contribution 
rates or maintain their current inadequate rate. However, once members were provided with 
specific information relating to the current status of their savings fewer members choose to 
reduce their contribution rates. This suggests that poor decisions may be due to members not 
realising how far they are from their retirement goals, and that once this is communicated 
members are capable of making better decisions resulting in improved benefit adequacy.  
When specific information is provided regarding the remedial actions that a member 
can take to better meet their retirement goals, the member is likely to make decisions that 
improve his retirement saving position. This shows that specific information that goes beyond 
how far a member has gone towards meeting their retirement goals, but actually gives 
positive actions that can be taken to improve their situation prompts more members to select 
the more optimal options. 
The results of the survey also show that members are more likely to preserve their 
benefits if they are provided with information that shows them the results of their non-
preservation. This suggests that members will assume they can make up any non-preserved 
benefits over a shorter time than would be required. This is consistent with the findings of 
Groyer and Holtzhausen (2006) who suggested that a lack of understanding of one’s 
retirement needs does result in reduced benefit preservation. Brown and Weisbenner (2007) 
also suggest that bounded rationality can result in members making sub-optimal choices 
regarding their retirement savings. A constraint could be limited information on the 
consequences of certain decisions. Old Mutual (2012) found that advice and guidance were 
significant determinants in whether individuals chose to preserve their benefits or take it out 
as cash. The results show that when members are given information both on the choices 
available to them, and the consequences of these choices, fewer members chose to take out a 
cash benefit. 
The results can, however, not be taken to mean that more information will necessarily 
result in better decision-making. In some scenarios the additional information led to no 
significant difference, depending on the information already available to the member. 
Question 2, which had a high level of information in its treatment A, showed the least 
significance in the other treatments. As an example, the additional information in treatment B 
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cost of providing the additional information may outweigh any benefit received by the 
members.  
Old Mutual (2012) found that 50% of members who receive benefit statements do not 
read them. This suggests that even when additional information could be useful unless 
members actually read their benefit statements or information provided by trustees the 
additional information will benefit even less members. The results of this survey are therefore 
useful in determining what must be provided to members to help them make optimal 
decisions regarding their contribution rates and preservation of benefits where members 
actually read and understand the information provided to them.  
6.5 Research Constraints and Limitations 
This research is informative and could be useful in determining the level of information that 
members of pension funds must be provided with. However, there are constraints and 
limitations that must be noted and considered when applying these results. 
The greatest limitation is that the participants may not be representative of the 
population to which the results are to be applied. The survey was designed to reduce this 
effect by targeting respondents from different companies and sectors of the economy. They 
included those who work in financial services, manufacturing, construction, retail and marine 
services. Whilst this measure was useful in ensuring the sample responses were more 
representative of the population, other factors could still have introduced an unrepresentative 
sample, and are discussed further below. 
The individuals who chose to answer the survey may not be a true representation of 
the broader pension fund population. Individuals who would answer a retirement survey are 
generally more likely to be those who are actively involved in their pension funds and make 
conscious decisions to improve their retirement savings position. Those who already exhibit 
apathy may be unwilling or unmotivated to participate. Hence results may show the typical 
response of members whose interest in their retirement saving is higher than that of the 
average member, and thus whose reported decisions are not likely to be typical of the average 
member. This would mean the sample used may not be the best representation of the broader 
population, and inference of the results on the population at large is inaccurate. This effect 
may have been reduced by the prize which offered an incentive to participate for the average 
member who might otherwise have been uninterested. 
Another reason that could make the sample a poor representation of the population is 
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to members of pension funds who have internet access in their workplace. This limited the 
demography of respondents to those who have internet access and whose jobs offer more 
opportunity to be online. As an example, members whose jobs do not include regular 
computer based work are less likely to participate in the survey.  
Another constraint may be the way the questions were presented. The survey used 
vignettes and not actual member actions. Whilst vignettes aid in allowing participants to 
freely show poor decision-making, they also remove the emotion and individual 
circumstances that a member would experience when making a decision. As an example, a 
respondent may be certain that on providing additional information, the character presented 
will choose to preserve their benefit on withdrawal from the fund. However, when presented 
with the same information the respondent may act differently as other factors may need to be 
considered. The temptation to take a cash benefit may be greater than assumed when 
answering the vignette. This is identified as the major obstacle relating to vignette studies, 
and its effect on this research must be considered. 
The research only looks at the effect of additional information and excludes other 
factors like the cost of providing this information, and the method by which such information 
would be communicated to the members. The cost of providing additional information may 
also include possible litigation if members’ benefits fall short of projections at retirement. 
The administrative cost of providing the information over the members’ working life-times 
may be significant, and reduce the retirement benefit further.  
The effectiveness of the information will also depend on the communication method. 
This will likely differ in different funds. There may also be a need for increased education of 
members in order for them to understand the different terms used in the communication, 
which would be an additional expense. An ineffective communication method may not yield 
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this research suggests that improving the quality and quantity of information 
provided to members of pension funds may result in better decision-making, and 
consequently improved retirement provisioning. The improvement, however, is dependent on 
the additional information provided. The results of the research may be useful for service 
providers of pension funds as well as trustees as they seek to find the optimal level of 
information that will result in better decision-making by members. 
The research leads us to tentatively conclude the following: 
1. The lack of adequate information likely leads to poor decision-making by pension 
fund members regarding their retirement saving. 
2. The provision of additional information may lead to better decision-making by 
members of pension funds. Information specific to the member’s situation is likely to 
result in better decision-making than general information. 
In our research problem we suggested that there are two questions that a member must be 
able to answer in order to close the gap between what the member has saved and what they 
expect to receive at retirement. These are: 
1. How much do I need to fund my retirement? – The research shows tentative 
evidence that when members are given contribution rate options that are linked to 
a particular benefit level they are more likely to choose the rate that provides a 
benefit in line with their needs. This is not seen when they are only given the 
contribution rate choices with no information on how each choice helps meet their 
benefit expectation. 
2. How much have I saved so far? – The research shows tentatively that when 
members are given information which shows whether their savings can meet 
retirement needs they make decisions that ensure they are on track to meet these 
goals.  
7.2 Recommendations 
The following recommendations can be made from the results of this research. 
Pension fund members should be provided with information that allows them to make 
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when the member is likely to make worse decisions than peers, but may also result in those 
who would want to choose a higher contribution rate deciding to select a lower one in line 
with the actions of their peers. Information on peer decisions must, therefore, be tailored to 
suit the audience and provide appropriate knowledge or it may lead to worse decisions. 
General information relating to the retirement needs of a typical member is useful for 
better decision-making. Information specific to the member may result in a higher proportion 
of members making better decisions, and reduce significantly those that make poor decisions. 
Information, therefore, should be tailored to the particular individual’s needs, subject to 
reasonable cost. Specific information tends to be more technical and may require educating 
members to ensure they understand it. It may also produce expectations of greater benefits for 
members and lead to increased litigation when benefits do not meet the projected values. It is 
therefore important that when specific information is provided members are clearly warned 
that it is subject to certain assumptions and can change. Sensitivity analysis can be used to 
show the effect of small changes in assumptions, although this will become even more 
expensive when provided on an individual basis. 
Members benefit from knowing the consequences of the options provided to them. 
This can be provided as a reduced or increased replacement ratio or other form that clearly 
shows the adverse or positive result of a decision.  
The regulator should consider providing clearer and more specific guidance on what 
constitutes adequate member information to guide trustees and service providers in addition 
to what is provided in Circular PF86.  
7.3 Further research 
The results of this research show that there is a relationship between the information provided 
and the decisions made by members of pension funds. There is, however, scope for further 
research. 
The gains resulting from improved information must not be eroded by the cost of 
providing this information. Further research which considers the cost benefit analysis of the 
different information levels would be required.  
A more intensive research using case studies to see how the effect of information 
affects decision-making in real-life situations is also required. This can be carried out over a 
longer period of time to see whether the behaviour reported in this survey will turn out the 










Effect of information on decision-making for members of DC pension funds Page 45 
 
Research that considers the effect of additional information on decision making for 
decisions other than contribution rates and preservation can be done. Such areas include 
investment choice, and the trade-off between insured benefits and retirement benefits over the 
members working life-time.  
Research into effective communication methods is also vital as any additional 
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Appendix A – Vignettes 
Please select the relevant demographic data relating to you. 
Gender  Male      Female 
Age   ≤20  21 – 30 31 – 40 41 – 50 51 – 60 ≥61 
Annual Income  <R100 000     R100 000–R200 000                                                     
R200 000–R300 000       >R300 000       Prefer not to disclose 
 
Question 1 
1A Sam is a 25 year old woman who is starting her first job. Her employer requires her to 
join the company’s pension fund. Sam is allowed to choose how much to contribute within 
the range of 5% to 10% of her monthly salary. The employer contributes 5% of salary for 
each member regardless of how much the member chooses to contribute into the fund. What 
do you think Sam is most likely to contribute into the fund? 
a) Sam chooses to contribute 5% as it is the lowest rate, and since she still has many 
years on the pension fund in which she can build up her benefit. 
b) Sam chooses to contribute 7% as this is somewhere in the middle of the allowable 
range. 
c) Sam selects 10% as she has no major expenses like children or a mortgage and 
understands the benefit of starting to save early. 
1B Sam is a 25 year old woman who is starting her first job. Her employer requires her to 
join the company’s pension fund. Sam is allowed to choose how much to contribute within 
the range of 5% to 10% of her monthly salary. The employer contributes 5% of salary for 
each member regardless of how much the member chooses to contribute into the fund. 
Information is also provided that shows that most members contribute 7% of their salary into 
the fund. What do you think Sam is most likely to contribute into the fund? 
a) Sam chooses to contribute 5% as it is the lowest rate, and since she still has many 
years on the pension fund in which she can build up her benefit. 
b) Sam chooses to contribute 7% as this is somewhere in the middle of the allowable 
range and is in line with most other members. 
c) Sam selects 10% as she has no major expenses like children or a mortgage and 
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1C Sam is a 25 year old woman who is starting her first job. Her employer requires her to 
join the company’s pension fund. Sam is allowed to choose how much to contribute within 
the range of 5% to 10% of her monthly salary. The employer contributes 5% of salary for 
each member regardless of how much the member chooses to contribute into the fund. 
Information is also provided that shows that most members contribute 7% of their salary into 
the fund. In addition, Sam is informed that a typical member will need, on average a total 
contribution (employer plus member) of between 12% and 15% of monthly salary over their 
working life-time to provide adequately for retirement, i.e. member contribution of between 
7% and 10% of salary. What do you think Sam is most likely to contribute into the fund? 
a) Sam chooses to contribute 5% as it is the lowest rate, and since she still has many 
years on the pension fund in which she can build up her benefit. 
b) Sam chooses to contribute 7% as this is somewhere in the middle of the allowable 
range, is in line with most other members and is in line with the minimum 
recommended rate for adequate savings for a typical member. 
c) Sam selects 10% as she has no major expenses like children or a mortgage and 




2A Peter is a 50 year old member of a pension fund, who earns R100,000 a year and has 
R170,000 saved in his pension fund as shown in his latest benefit statement. He is expecting 
to retire at age 65 and currently contributes to the fund at a rate of 6% of his salary. The 
employer also contributes 6% of the member’s salary on his behalf bringing his total 
contribution into the fund per month to 12% of salary. His benefit statement also advises him 
of the following:  
 He has the option to change his member contribution to between 4% and 12% of 
salary i.e. total contribution of between 10% and 18% of salary. 
 The average member contribution rate is 5% i.e. a total contribution of 11% of salary  
 Members will on average need a total contribution (employer plus member) of 
between 12% and 15% to provide adequately for retirement, i.e. member contribution 
of between 6% and 9% of salary.  
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a) He does not change his member contribution as it is already above the average rate 
and within the recommended range as stated in the benefit statement. 
b) He decreases his member contribution to 5% in line with what most other members 
are contributing. 
c) He increases his member contribution to 9% as it is the maximum of the range 
specified in the benefit statement as adequate for the typical member. 
d) He increases his member contribution to 12% as he is nearing retirement and wants 
to ensure he has enough saved up. 
 
2B Peter is a 50 year old member of a pension fund, who earns R100,000 a year and has 
R170,000 saved in his pension fund as shown in his latest benefit statement. He is expecting 
to retire at age 65 and currently contributes to the fund at a rate of 6% of his salary. The 
employer also contributes 6% of the member’s salary on his behalf bringing his total 
contribution into the fund per month to 12% of salary. His benefit statement also advises him 
of the following:  
 He has the option to change his member contribution to between 4% and 12% of 
salary i.e. total contribution of between 10% and 18% of salary. 
 The average member contribution rate is 5% i.e. a total contribution of 11% of salary  
 Members will on average need a total contribution (employer plus member) of 
between 12% and 15% to provide adequately for retirement, i.e. member contribution 
of between 6% and 9% of salary.  
 If he continues to contribute at the current rate of 6%, Peter is projected to receive a 
benefit of 45% of his final salary at retirement. Ideally Peter would wish to retire on 
an income of at least 55% of his final salary. 
What changes do you think Peter is most likely to make to his member contribution rate? 
a) He does not change his member contribution as it is already above the average rate 
and within the recommended range as stated in the benefit statement. 
b) He decreases his member contribution to 5% in line with what most other members 
are contributing. 
c) He increases his member contribution to 9% as it is the maximum of the range 
specified in the benefit statement as adequate for the typical member. 
d) He increases his member contribution to 12% as he is nearing retirement and wants 
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2C Peter is a 50 year old member of a pension fund, who earns R100,000 a year and has 
R170,000 saved in his pension fund as shown in his latest benefit statement. He is expecting 
to retire at age 65 and currently contributes to the fund at a rate of 6% of his salary. The 
employer also contributes 6% of the member’s salary on his behalf bringing his total 
contribution into the fund per month to 12% of salary. His benefit statement also advises him 
of the following:  
 He has the option to change his member contribution to between 4% and 12% of 
salary i.e. total contribution of between 10% and 18% of salary. 
 The average member contribution rate is 5% i.e. a total contribution of 11% of salary  
 Members will on average need a total contribution (employer plus member) of 
between 12% and 15% to provide adequately for retirement, i.e. member contribution 
of between 6% and 9% of salary.  
 If he continues to contribute at the current rate of 6%, Peter is projected to receive a 
benefit of 45% of his final salary at retirement. Ideally Peter would wish to retire on 
an income of at least 55% of his final salary. 
 A member contribution rate of 12% of salary per month (i.e. total contribution rate of 
18%) can bring his projected retirement benefit to 55% of salary. 
What changes do you think Peter is most likely to make to his member contribution rate? 
a) He does not change his member contribution as it is already above the average rate 
and within the recommended range as stated in the benefit statement. 
b) He decreases his member contribution to 5% in line with what most other members 
are contributing. 
c) He increases his member contribution to 9% as it is the maximum of the range 
specified in the benefit statement as adequate for the typical member. 
d) He increases his member contribution to 12% as he is nearing retirement and this is 



















3A Luke is a 35 year old member of a DC pension fund, who has worked for the same 
company for 10 years. His accumulated share of fund is R75,000. He has accepted a position 
at a different company and has withdrawn from the Pension Fund. He will receive the full 
value of his share of fund and the benefit is payable as: 
1. A cash benefit paid into his bank account after tax is deducted. 
2. A transfer to the new pension fund he will be joining with no tax deduction. 
3. A transfer of a portion of his share of fund to the new pension fund and the remainder 
in cash. 
How will Luke most likely choose to receive his benefit? 
a) A cash benefit that he can spend or invest as required 
b) A transfer to the new fund  
c) A partial transfer to the new fund and the remainder in cash. 
 
3B Luke is a 35 year old member of a DC pension fund, who has worked for the same 
company for 10 years. His accumulated share of fund is R75,000. He has accepted a position 
at a different company and has withdrawn from the Pension Fund. He will receive the full 
value of his share of fund and the benefit is payable as: 
1. A cash benefit paid into his bank account after tax is deducted. 
2. A transfer to the new pension fund he will be joining with no tax deduction. 
3. A transfer of a portion of his share of fund to the new pension fund and the remainder 
in cash. 
The trustees of his fund, in consultation with the fund’s actuary prepare a document that 
explains the consequences of the different actions. The following are the major points made 
 Members who fail to preserve their benefits on moving between companies when 
between the ages of 35 and 45 on average retire with 26% less than those who do. 
How will Luke most likely choose to receive his benefit? 
a) A cash benefit that he can spend or invest as required 
b) A transfer to the new fund  
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3C Luke is a 35 year old member of a DC pension fund, who has worked for the same 
company for 10 years. His accumulated share of fund is R75,000. He has accepted a position 
at a different company and has withdrawn from the Pension Fund. He will receive the full 
value of his share of fund and the benefit is payable as 
 
1. A cash benefit paid into his bank account after tax is deducted. 
2. A transfer to the new pension fund he will be joining with no tax deduction. 
3. A transfer of a portion of his share of fund to the new pension fund and the remainder 
in cash. 
The trustees of his fund, in consultation with the fund’s actuary prepare a document that 
explains the consequences of the different actions. The following are the major points made 
 Members who fail to preserve their benefits on moving between companies on 
average retire with 26% less than those who do. 
 If the benefit is not preserved, Luke will need to contribute an additional 4.3% of his 
salary for the rest of his working life-time to come to the same benefit as if he had 
preserved his benefit. 
 If he preserves just half of his current benefit, he will have to retire at 67 years rather 
than 65 to get the same benefit as if he had preserved the full amount, assuming he 
continues to contribute at the same level he has been to date. 
How will Luke most likely choose to receive his benefit: 
a) A cash benefit that he can spend or invest as required 
b) A transfer to the new fund  
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Appendix B: Summary of Responses 
The tables below illustrate the demographic data relating to the survey responses. These have 
been split to show the responses excluding the initial pilot and including the initial pilot. 
 
Table B1: Respondents split according to gender  
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Appendix C: Statistical tests 
The following test statistic was used for all tests shown. 
 




 follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
 is the proportion in treatment  
 is the proportion in treatment , and 






 is the number of responses in treatment  
 is the number of responses in treatment  
 
Question 1 
Proportion who select the 5% contribution rate. 
H0: The proportion of participants who chose the 5% contribution rate is the same in 
treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who chose the 5% contribution rate is higher in treatment i 
than in j. 
The table below shows the results of the difference in proportions z test applied to 
combinations of the treatments A, B and C. 
 
 i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 47% 24% 68 45 38% 9.33% 2.4238    0.77% Reject strong evidence
B C 24% 19% 45 63 21% 7.99% 0.6754    24.97% Cannot reject
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Proportion who select the 7% contribution rate 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose the 7% contribution rate is the same in 
treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who choose the 7% contribution rate is higher in treatment 
j than in i. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
Proportion who select the 10% contribution rate
H0: The proportion of participants who choose the 10% contribution rate is the same in
treatment i and j.
H1: The proportion of participants who choose the 10% contribution rate is higher in 
treatment j than in i.
The results are illustrated in the table below.
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 25% 13% 68 45 20% 7.74% 1.5079    93.42% Cannot reject
B C 13% 30% 45 63 23% 8.23% -2.0438 2.05% Reject strong evidence
A C 25% 30% 68 63 27% 7.81% -0.6608 25.44% Cannot reject
H0: The proportion of participants who choose the 10% contribution rate is the same in
treatment i and j.
H1: The proportion of participants who choose the 10% contribution rate is higher in 
treatment i than in j.
The results are shown in the table below.
Question 2 
Proportion in 5% or 6% 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose the 5% or 6% contribution rates is the same in 
treatment i and j. 
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 28% 62% 68 45 42% 9.47% -3.6194 0.01% Reject strong evidence
B C 62% 51% 45 63 56% 9.70% 1.1784 88.07% Cannot reject
A C 28% 51% 68 63 39% 8.53% -2.6802 0.37% Reject strong evidence
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
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H1: The proportion of participants who choose the 5% or 6% contribution rates is higher in 
treatment i than in j. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
 
Proportion in 9% 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose the 9% contribution rate is the same in 
treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who choose the 9% contribution rate is higher in treatment 
j than in i. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
 
 
Proportion in 12% 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose the 12% contribution rate is the same in 
treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who choose the 12% contribution rate is higher in 
treatment j than in i. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
 
Question 3 
Proportion who select a cash benefit 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose to receive their benefit as cash is the same in 
treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who choose to receive their benefit as cash is higher in 
treatment i than in j. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 31% 24% 59 54 27% 8.40% 0.7657    22.19% Cannot reject
B C 24% 19% 54 59 21% 7.70% 0.7050    24.04% Cannot reject
A C 31% 19% 59 59 25% 7.93% 1.4967    6.72% Reject - weak evidence
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 32% 37% 59 54 35% 8.95% -0.5399   29.46% Cannot reject
B C 37% 25% 54 59 31% 8.71% 1.3336    90.88% Cannot reject
A C 32% 25% 59 59 29% 8.34% 0.8131    79.19% Cannot reject
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 37% 39% 59 54 38% 9.14% -0.1751   43.05% Cannot reject
B C 39% 56% 54 59 48% 9.41% -1.8117   3.50% Reject strong evidence














Proportion who select a partial transfer 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose to receive their benefit as a partial transfer is 
the same in treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who choose to receive their benefit as a partial is higher in 
treatment j than in i. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
 
 
Proportion who select a full transfer 
H0: The proportion of participants who choose to receive their benefit as full transfer is the 
same in treatment i and j. 
H1: The proportion of participants who choose to receive their benefit as a full transfer is 
higher in treatment j than in i. 
The results are illustrated in the table below. 
 
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 30% 5% 60 59 18% 6.99% 3.5647    0.02% Reject strong evidence
B C 5% 9% 59 54 7% 4.83% -0.8642   80.63% Cannot reject
A C 30% 9% 60 54 20% 7.53% 2.7553    0.29% Reject strong evidence
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 20% 42% 60 59 31% 8.49% -2.6363   0.42% Reject strong evidence
B C 42% 20% 59 54 32% 8.77% 2.5075    99.39% Cannot reject
A C 20% 20% 60 54 20% 7.53% -0.0492   48.04% Cannot reject
i j Pi Pj Ni Nj P SE Z P-value Decision on H0
A B 50% 53% 60 59 51% 9.16% -0.2774   39.07% Cannot reject
B C 53% 70% 59 54 61% 9.18% -1.9414   2.61% Reject strong evidence
A C 50% 70% 60 54 60% 9.20% -2.2136   1.34% Reject strong evidence
